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I. INTRODUCTION
From the heated rhetoric of both proponents and opponents of UCITA, one would think that UCITA
represented a radical change from current law. From the standpoint of this practitioner, however, UCITA
represents more of an evolutionary than a revolutionary change in the law. In at least three critical areas, the
enforceability of "paperless contracts," dispute resolution, and "self-help" remedies, UCITA is arguably
consistent with current law or at least the trend of current law. Indeed, the main inconsistency between
UCITA and current law is that current law is at times inconsistent. From the standpoint of most businesses,
certainty is preferable to uncertainty. Therefore, a rule of law that is consistently bad may well be preferable
to a rule that -- while theoretically good -- is applied so inconsistently that the rights and obligations of the
parties are in doubt. In any event, this paper compares current law with the changes resulting from UCITA for

the purpose of assessing just how significant a change UCITA really represents.
II. MAKING PAPERLESS CONTRACTS ENFORCEABLE
A. Admissibility = Enforceability
1. Obviously, whether a contract is enforceable becomes an issue only when there is
a contractual dispute that may be headed to litigation. At that point, the contract will
be enforceable only if it is admissible. Long before the adoption of UCITA, the
federal courts have allowed, and in some cases required, the use of electronic
records in litigation.
2. It is well-settled that something does not have to be in tangible, written form to
constitute a "document." For example, in Williams v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs [1]
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit [2] held that draft letters and reports
stored in electronic form are "records" within the meaning of the Privacy Act of
1974. [3]
3. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define "documents" to include "writings,
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, phonorecords, and other data compilations
from which information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the respondent
through detection devices into reasonably usable form . . . ." [4]
4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not only permit litigants to produce records
in electronic form, they sometimes require litigants to do so.
a. In National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. [5] the
court ordered the plaintiff to create a digital version of database reports
that it had produced in hard copy form so they could be analyzed via
computer.
b. In Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig [6] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit [7] held that "Rule 34 contemplates that when data is in
an inaccessible form, the party responding to the request for documents
must make the data available."
5. Litigants who fail to preserve data in electronic form once they are notified to do
so for purposes of litigation face severe sanctions.
a. In William T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp. [8] the courtordered sanctions for GNC's deletion of electronic records after it had
been ordered to preserve its business records included striking its
answer to the complaint, entering a default judgment against it, and
dismissing its complaint in related litigation. [9]

B. The Statute of Frauds in Cyberspace
1. Traditionally, a writing is required to evidence an enforceable contract. The
Uniform Commercial Code requires a "writing" that has been "signed" by the person
against whom enforcement is sought for a contract for the sale of goods at a price of

$500 or more to be enforceable. [10]
a. "'Writing' includes printing, typewriting or any other intentional
reduction to tangible form." [11]
b. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with
present intention to authenticate a writing." [12]
2. In electronic commerce transactions, there may not be a hard copy of a written
contract, and it may not have been signed by anyone. This commercial reality raises
the issue of when there has been a "written" offer and acceptance sufficient to
establish a binding contract.
3. In the United States, the federal courts have recently begun to recognize the
enforceability of "clickwrap" agreements whereby acceptance of an offer is
indicated by typing or clicking. For example, in CompuServe v. Patterson [13] the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit [14] held that the defendant had entered
into a written agreement with CompuServe (and was therefore subject to jurisdiction
in Ohio, whose law governed the contract) by typing "Agree" at various points
throughout the online agreement with which CompuServe had presented it. [15]
4. Decisions such as CompuServe are consistent with both current law and pending
proposals that would clarify that a handwritten signature is just one of many ways of
indicating acceptance of an offer.
a. Under the current Uniform Commercial Code (the "UCC"), "(a)
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes
the existence of a contract." [16] This is consistent with the Restatement
of Contracts, Section 19 of which states "the manifestation of assent
may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other
acts or by a failure to act." [17]
b. A new U.C.C. Article 2B, proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute,
would clarify, in the context of electronic commerce transactions, the
traditional requirement of a writing is not necessary to manifest assent:
"Manifesting assent does not require a signature, any
specific type of language or conduct, or any formalities. It
can be shown by an authentication, by any conduct
including use or other performance with respect to the
subject matter, or by words." [18]
5. In both the United States and internationally, "digital signature" statutes provide
that, if authenticated in accordance with statutory provisions, an electronic signature
is entitled to as much binding effect as a written one.
a. Revised Articles 2 and 2A and proposed Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code substitute the term "authenticate" for the requirement
of a signature.

i. The term "authenticate" is defined as:
"to sign, execute or adopt a symbol or sound,
or encrypt or process a record in whole or part,
with intent by the authenticating person to: (A)
identify that person; (B) adopt or accept a
record or term that contains the authentication
or to which a record containing the
authentication refers; or (C) attest to the
integrity of a record or term that contains the
authentication or to which a record containing
the authentication refers." [19]
ii. Proposed Article 2B specifically provides that "a record
or authentication may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely on the ground that it is in electronic
form." [20] The purpose of this section is "to avoid any
uncertainty about the efficacy of electronic records and
signatures under state law as they apply to transactions
covered by Article 2B." [21]
b. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA"), proposed by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, would
similarly ensure the enforceability of electronic contracts.
i. UETA equates an "electronic record" [22] with a
"writing":
"(a) A record may not be denied legal effect,
validity or enforceability solely because it is an
electronic record. (b) If a rule of law requires a
record to be in writing, or provides
consequences if it is not, an electronic record
satisfies that rule." [23]
ii. UETA also validates "electronic signatures" [24] for
purposes of the Statute of Frauds:
"(a) A signature may not be denied legal effect,
validity, or enforceability solely because it is in
the form of an electronic signature.
(b) If a rule of law requires a signature, or
provides consequences in the absence of a
signature, the rule of law is satisfied with
respect to an electronic record if the electronic
record includes an electronic signature." [25]

c. The first digital signature statute in the United States, which was
adopted in Utah in 1995, provided a model for subsequent enactments

in Minnesota, Washington, and elsewhere.
i. The "digital signature" is actually encryption of an
electronic message which allows the recipient to verify its
sender.
ii. The verification is accomplished by a third party known
as a "certification authority."
iii. Under the Utah statute, a digitally signed message
satisfies the requirement of a "writing" and a "signature" if
it has been verified by a licensed certification authority.
[26]
iv. In November 1997, Utah licensed Digital Signature
Trust Company to provide digital signature authentication
and certification services to business and government. This
was the first time in the world a government had licensed a
"certification authority." [27]
d. Germany is among the countries with a similar Digital Signature Act.
i. Under the German Civil Code, a writing is not required
for there to be an enforceable contract.
ii. The Digital Signature Act provides for a "digital
signature" whereby digitized data intended for electronic
transmission is sealed and labeled so that the recipient can
verify the sender's authenticity and determine whether the
data has remained unchanged after application of the digital
signature. [28]
iii. This obstacle can be overcome by procedural provisions
allowing for production of evidence by judicial inspection.
C. Changes Resulting from UCITA
1. Key Concepts
a. Record = Document
"(54) 'Record' means information that is inscribed on a
tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." [29]
b. Authenticate = Signature
"(6) 'Authenticate' means (i) to sign or (ii) with the intent to
sign a record, to execute or adopt an electronic symbol,
sound, message, or process referring to, attached to,
included in, or logically associated or linked with, that
record." [30]

2. Manifesting Assent
"(a) A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person, acting
with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record
or term or a copy of it:
(1) authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or
accept it; or
(2) intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements
with reason to know that the other party or its electronic
agent may infer from the conduct or statement that the
person assents to the record or term.
(b) An electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if, after
having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent:
(1) authenticates the record or term; or
(2) engages in operations that in the circumstances indicate
acceptance of the record or term.
(c) If this chapter or other law requires assent to a specific term, a
manifestation of assent must relate specifically to the term.
(d) Conduct or operations manifesting assent may be proved in any
manner, including showing that a person or an electronic agent obtained
or used the information or informational rights and that a procedure
existed by which a person or an electronic agent must have engaged in
the conduct or operations in order to do so. Proof of compliance with
subsection (a) (2) is sufficient if there is conduct that assents and
subsequent conduct that reaffirms assent by electronic means."[31]
3. Relationship With Other Laws
"(d) If a law of this Commonwealth in effect on the effective date of
this chapter applies to a transaction governed by this chapter, the
following rules apply:
(1) A requirement that a term, waiver, notice, or disclaimer
be in a writing is satisfied by a record.
(2) A requirement that a record, writing, or term be signed
is satisfied by an authentication.
(3) A requirement that a term be conspicuous, or the like,
is satisfied by a term that is conspicuous under this chapter.
(4) A requirement of consent or agreement to a term is
satisfied by a manifestation of assent to the term in
accordance with this chapter." [32]

4. Enforceability of Electronic Records
"(a) A record or authentication may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(b) This chapter does not require that a record or authentication be
generated, stored, sent, received, or otherwise processed by electronic
means or in electronic form.
(c) In any transaction, a person may establish requirements regarding
the type of authentication or record acceptable to it.
(d) A person that uses an electronic agent that it has selected for
making an authentication, performance, or agreement, including
manifestation of assent, is bound by the operations of the electronic
agent, even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the agent's
operations or the results of the operations." [33]
5. Proof and Effect of Authentication
"(a) Authentication may be proven in any manner, including a showing
that a party made use of information or access that could have been
available only if it engaged in conduct or operations that authenticated
the record or term.
(b) Compliance with a commercially reasonable attribution procedure
agreed to or adopted by the parties or established by law for
authenticating a record authenticates the record as a matter of law." [34]
6. Contract Formation
"(a) A contract may be formed in any manner sufficient to show
agreement, including offer and acceptance or conduct of both parties or
operations of electronic agents which recognize the existence of a
contract.
(b) If the parties so intend, an agreement sufficient to constitute a
contract may be found even if the time of its making is undetermined,
one or more terms are left open or to be agreed on, the records of the
parties do not otherwise establish a contract, or one party reserves the
right to modify terms.
(c) Even if one or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon, a
contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate
remedy.
(d) In the absence of conduct or performance by both parties to the
contrary, a contract is not formed if there is a material disagreement
about a material term, including a term concerning scope.
(e) If a term is to be adopted by later agreement and the parties intend

not to be bound unless the term is so adopted, a contract is not formed if
the parties do not agree to the term. In that case, each party shall deliver
to the other party, or with the consent of the other party destroy, all
copies of information, access materials, and other materials received or
made, and each party is entitled to a return with respect to any contract
fee paid for which performance has not been received, has not been
accepted, or has been redelivered without any benefit being retained.
The parties remain bound by any contractual use term only with respect
to information or copies received or made from copies received
pursuant to the agreement, but the contractual use term does not apply
to information or copies properly received or obtained from another
source." [35]
7. Formation By Electronic Agents
a. Definition
"(27) 'Electronic agent' means a computer program, or
electronic or other automated means, used by a person to
initiate an action, or to respond to electronic messages or
performances, on the person's behalf without review or
action by an individual at the time of the action or response
to the message or performance." [36]
b. Offer and Acceptance
"(a) A contract may be formed by the interaction of
electronic agents. If the interaction results in the electronic
agents' engaging in operations that under the circumstances
indicate acceptance of an offer, a contract is formed, but a
court may grant appropriate relief if the operations resulted
from fraud, electronic mistake, or the like.
(b) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an
electronic agent and an individual acting on the individual's
own behalf or for another person. A contract is formed if
the individual takes an action or makes a statement that the
individual can refuse to take or say and that the individual
has reason to know will:
(1) cause the electronic agent to perform,
provide benefits, or allow the use or access that
is the subject of the contract, or send
instructions to do so; or
(2) indicate acceptance, regardless of other
expressions or actions by the individual to
which the individual has reason to know the
electronic agent cannot react.
(c) The terms of a contract formed under subsection (b) are

determined under § 59.1-502.8 or § 59.1-502.9 but do not
include a term provided by the individual if the individual
had reason to know that the electronic agent could not react
to the term." [37]
III. ENFORCING CONTRACTS
A. Traditional Principles of Jurisdiction In American Courts
1. The "Due Process" Clause of the Constitution of the United States provides that "
[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . . ." [38]
2. The "Minimum Contacts" Test
a. Before an American court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a
citizen of another state or another country, due process requires that the
non-resident defendant have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the
forum state so that the exercise of jurisdiction would not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [39]
b. To satisfy the "minimum contacts" test, three elements must be
present: (1) purposeful availment; (2) relatedness; and (3)
reasonableness.
3. Purposeful Availment:
"[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws." [40]
4. Relatedness and Reasonableness:
"[S]uch contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make
it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." [41]
B. Mere Advertisement or Solicitation for Sale of Goods and Services on the Internet Probably
Insufficient to Establish Jurisdiction
1. In Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. [42] the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit [43] held that the defendant had not substantially availed itself of the
privilege of doing business merely by posting "an essentially passive home page on
the web." The mere fact that the web site could be accessed by Arizona residents
was insufficient to support the inference that the defendant "deliberately directed its
merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents." [44] The defendant "entered into
no contracts in Arizona, made no sales in Arizona, received no telephone calls from
Arizona, earned no income from Arizona, and sent no messages." [45]
2. The view of the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell is probably the majority view.

a. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, [46] [no jurisdiction over Hong Kong
defendant who advertised in trade journal posted on the Internet without
sale of goods or services in Arkansas].
b. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, [47] [trademark infringement suit by
jazz club named "The Blue Note" in Greenwich Village against jazz
club named "The Blue Note" in Columbia, Missouri; defendant had
done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New York
merely by creating a passive web site that described the club and
contained a calendar of events and information about ordering tickets].
c. Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., [48] [in trademark
infringement case, defendant's web site, which advertises its services
and permits the sending of e-mail to the defendant, was insufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction because the defendant did not
specifically direct any sales activity to Illinois].
3. Some courts, however, have found jurisdiction in trademark infringement cases
where the infringement resulted from an Internet web site.
a. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, [49] [defendant infringed plaintiff's
federally registered trademark INSET by obtaining domain address
"INSET.COM" and using telephone number "1-800-US-INSET"; court
found "purposeful availment" because advertising activities directed via
Internet to Connecticut, as was its toll-free telephone number].
b. Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, [50] [infringing web site could provide
basis for jurisdiction over Illinois corporation based upon "reasonable
inference" that web site has been visited by North Carolina residents].
c. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., [51] [personal jurisdiction
exercised over Colorado corporation whose web site, CLUE.COM,
allegedly infringed registered trademark CLUE because web site
advertised "Clue will go to any customers [sic] site!"; web site offered
address, phone number, and e-mail address of defendant; and web site
"has undoubtedly been accessed by Massachusetts residents"].
C. What Satisfies the "Something More" Necessary to Show "Purposeful Availment" and
Therefore Jurisdiction?
1. "Interactive" Web Sites:
a. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., [52] [finding purposeful
availment based on Dot Com's interactive web site and contracts with
3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania
allowing them to download the electronic messages that form the basis
of the suit].
b. Maritz Inc. v. Cybergold Inc., [53][browsers encouraged to add
address to mailing list that subscribed user to the service].
2. Evidence That Internet Activity Was Directed At, Or Bore Fruit In, Forum State:

a. Cf. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., [sustained contact with District of
Columbia established by, inter alia, web page that solicited
contributions and provided toll-free telephone number plus defendant's
use on the web page of allegedly infringing trademark and logo]; and
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., [declining
jurisdiction where defendant consumer subscribed to plaintiff's travel
reservation system but was solicited and served instate by supplier's
local representative]. [54]
b. In EDIAS Software Int'l L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l Ltd., [55] the defendant
sent advertising and allegedly defamatory statements over the Internet
through e-mail, its web page, and forums. The defendant had a contract
with the plaintiff, an Arizona company, and made sales to plaintiff and
other Arizona customers. In addition, the defendant's employees visited
Arizona during the course of the business relationship with the plaintiff.
The court concluded that the defendant "should not be permitted to take
advantage of modern technology through an Internet Web page and
forum and simultaneously escape traditional notions of jurisdiction."
[56]
3. Use of an Internet Service Provider in the Forum State:
a. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, [57] [Patterson had purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio by
subscribing to CompuServe, placing computer software "shareware" on
CompuServe system pursuant to a Shareware Registration Agreement
containing an Ohio choice-of-law clause, making sales in Ohio, and
receiving transmission of funds from CompuServe in Ohio].
b. To the extent someone has engaged in "hacking" or otherwise made
improper use of e-mail or an Internet web site, computer crimes statutes
may provide a basis for jurisdiction and liability where it otherwise
might not exist.
4. Intentional Torts
a. The Effects Doctrine
i. In tort cases, jurisdiction may attach if the defendant's
conduct is aimed at or has an effect in the forum state.
ii. Calder v. Jones, [58] [National Enquirer story that
libeled California resident gave rise to jurisdiction in
California because California was the "focal point both of
the story and of the harm suffered...[j]urisdiction...proper in
California based on the "effects" of [the defendants']
Florida conduct"]
b. Does trademark infringement satisfy the "effects" test?
i. No, according to the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc. [59]

ii. Five months later, on April 17, 1998, the Ninth Circuit
decided Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, [60] holding that
the California court had jurisdiction over an Illinois
defendant accused of being a "cyber pirate," i.e., someone
"who steals valuable trademarks and establishes domain
names on the Internet using these trademarks to sell the
domain names to the rightful trademark owners." [61]
iii. In contrast to the trademark infringement at issue in
Cybersell, in Panavision the Ninth Circuit found the
"effects" test to be satisfied because "the present case is
akin to a tort case":
"We agree that simply registering someone
else's trademark as a domain name and posting
a web site on the Internet is not sufficient to
subject a party domiciled in one state to
jurisdiction in another. As we said in
Cybersell, there must be 'something more' to
demonstrate that the defendant directed his
activity toward the forum state. Here, that has
been shown. Toeppen engaged in a scheme to
register Panavision's trademarks as his domain
names for the purpose of extorting money from
Panavision. His conduct, as he knew it likely
would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in
California where Panavision has its principal
place of business and where the movie and
television industry is centered. Under the
'effects test,' the purposeful availment
requirement necessary for specific, personal
jurisdiction is satisfied." [62]
D. Comparative Law
1. The High Court of England reached a result similar to that of the Ninth Circuit in
Panavision based on similar facts.
a. The defendants in British Telecomm. PLC v. One In A Million Ltd.
[63] were "domain name hijackers" who registered as domain names the
names or trademarks of famous companies. For example, one of the
defendants offered to sell the domain name burgerking.co.uk to the
Burger King fast food chain for £ 25,000.
b. The court enjoined the defendants' use of the infringing domain
names and ordered them assigned to the plaintiffs.
c. Because both the plaintiffs and the defendants were in the U.K., the
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction arose only to the extent that the
defendants were required to assign certain U.S. contractual rights to
domain names. In finding that the defendants were guilty of "passing

off," the High Court found that the defendants intended to infringe the
plaintiffs' trademark rights. Therefore, an exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would have been justified under the rationale of Panavision.
2. A recent decision of a French court suggests a somewhat broader view of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over claims of domain name infringement than that
adopted by most U.S. courts.
a. In Commune de Saint Tropez v. S.a. Eurovirtuel [64] the District
Court of Draguigan ordered the defendant to cease use of the Internet
domain name Saint-Tropez.com in the United States.
b. The plaintiff, the City of Saint-Tropez, is the owner of the registered
French trademark SAINT-TROPEZ.
c. The French court rejected the defendant's claim that it lacked
jurisdiction on the grounds that the Saint-Tropez.com domain name was
on a server in the United States. The French court rejected this
argument because the web site was accessible from France.
d. This expansive view of jurisdiction raises the potential for a "world
without borders" and disputes as to whose law governs. Note, however,
that the defendant was a French company. Therefore, the decision may
be less remarkable than if, for example, it involved a U.S. company's
domain name registration.
E. Choice of Law and Forum Clauses
1. "PROs"
a. They offer the potential to avoid the application of unfavorable laws
in some jurisdictions.
b. They offer the potential to reduce litigation costs by choosing state
law with which counsel is familiar, by choosing a forum which is
located near the party or its counsel, or by choosing a forum which is
relatively fast to decide disputes--such as the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia [a/k/a the "Rocket Docket"].
c. They can result in predictability of judicial interpretation [although
sometimes the interpretation is predictably bad].
d. The parties can sometimes avoid collateral litigation over what law
applies.
2. "CONs"
a. They can result in problems enforcing judgments overseas. The
United States, most states and most foreign countries only will enforce
foreign judgments which are final. Thus, the victorious party in its own
state who must enforce its judgment in the loser's home state probably
will be required to wait until all appeals have terminated before

enforcing the judgment. In addition, prevailing in litigation in the
foreign forum will be useless if the loser's home state or country refuses
on public policy grounds to enforce the judgment or to recognize it for
res judicata purposes.
b. Vague public policy limitations, considerations of "reasonableness,"
and uncertainty as to the interaction of state and federal law make the
enforceability of law and forum selection provisions an issue which is
ripe for litigation. Of course, omitting such provisions is not necessary
to avoid collateral litigation. A party can always avoid collateral
litigation simply by conceding the provision's validity or waiving
enforcement if the benefits afforded by the chosen law are outweighed
by the costs of collateral litigation.
3. In federal courts, a forum selection provision negotiated in an arm's length
negotiation by experienced businessmen is generally enforceable "absent some
compelling and countervailing reason" to set it aside. [65] However, it may be
unenforceable under one of two circumstances. The first recognized ground for
voiding a forum selection clause is if it is so "manifestly and gravely" inconvenient
that it effectively deprives the party seeking to avoid the chosen forum of a
meaningful day in court. [66] The second is if enforcement would result in
application of law which contravenes a strong public policy of the state in which the
action is commenced. [67] Even in the case of a contract between two American
parties in which a remote foreign forum is selected, the party seeking to avoid the
forum selection provision on the ground of inconvenience should bear a "heavy
burden" of proving that the agreement is adhesive or that the particular dispute is not
covered by the agreement. [68]
4. Some states, however, have common law limitations on the enforceability of
forum selection clauses. The modern view among state courts is that they will
enforce forum selection provisions unless the party challenging enforcement
establishes that such provisions are unfair or unreasonable, or are affected by fraud
or grossly unequal bargaining power. [69] However, the law of several states is that
forum selection provisions are invalid as contrary to public policy. These states
include: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Maine, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas
and possibly Massachusetts and West Virginia, where there are divisions of
authority. [70]
5. In federal court, federal procedural law governs federal court enforcement of
forum selection provisions in diversity cases. Therefore, a potential means of
circumventing state laws against forum-selection provisions is for a franchisor to file
its action in federal court or remove the case to federal court.
6. The fact that a contract has a forum selection clause does not, of course, mean that
the defendant will not seek a venue transfer on grounds of, for example, forum non
conveniens. Mere inconvenience is not a proper ground for invalidating a forum
selection provision. If inconvenience of the foreign forum was foreseeable at the
time of contracting, then the party seeking to avoid a transfer into the selected forum
on the ground that it is inconvenient bears the burden of showing that "trial in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court." [71] A First Circuit decision

applied Bremen to uphold a decision transferring a case from Puerto Rico, the
distributor's home state, to the selected forum in Brazil, the manufacturer's home
state. [72]
7. Bremen's presumption in favor of enforcing forum selection provisions also
applies when one party seeks to transfer venue out of the selected forum under the
forum non conveniens doctrine and 28 U.S.C § 1404(a)(1994).
8. The Supreme Court has held that a forum selection provision in a contract is a
"significant factor that figures centrally" in denying a motion to transfer venue out of
the selected forum. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. [73] Thus, a forum selection
clause must be given "controlling weight in all but the most exceptional
circumstances." [74]
9. A forum selection provision, standing alone, is sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. [75] Absent a statute to the contrary,
choice of law provisions are enforceable in most states unless either (1) the state
whose law is selected bears no reasonable relationship to the dispute or (2) the
selected law contravenes a strong public policy of a state which has a materially
greater interest in the dispute and would be the state whose law would apply under
general conflicts rules in the absence of an effective choice of law. [76]
10. In Virginia, so long as the choice of law provision is not unconscionable, it is
likely to be enforced. [77]
11. Some courts have refused to permit franchisors to use choice of law provisions
to escape protectionist statutes of the franchisee's home state on the basis that
enforcing the choice of law provision would contravene a strong public policy of the
forum state. [78] However, many courts have also enforced choice of law clauses
which circumvented protectionist laws, making the parties stick to their bargain.
[79]
12. Entering into a contract containing a choice of law provision constitutes
purposeful availment of the laws of the chosen state. Therefore, a choice of law
provision is an important factor in establishing that federal courts in the chosen state
have personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. [80] However, a choice of
law clause does not by itself confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant. [81]
13. Choice of forum clauses may provide that each party consents to venue and
jurisdiction in the home forum of the other party and waives all unilateral objections
to the inconvenience of the forum. Mutual consent provisions allow the plaintiff
before filing suit to consider whether it effectively could enforce a judgment
obtained in its home state.
F. Effect of UCITA
1. Choice of Law Provisions
a. Enforceability:
"(a) The parties in their agreement may choose the
applicable law. However, the choice is not enforceable in a

consumer contract to the extent it would vary a rule that
may not be varied by agreement under the law of Virginia.
(b) In the absence of an enforceable agreement on choice
of law, the contract is governed by the law of Virginia."
[82]
b. Agreement that UCITA applies/does not apply:
"The parties may agree that this chapter, including contractformation rules, governs the transaction, in whole or part,
or that other law governs the transaction and this chapter
does not apply, if a material part of the subject matter to
which the agreement applies is computer information or
informational rights in it that are within the scope of this
chapter, or is subject matter within this chapter under
§ 59.1-501.3 (b), or is subject matter excluded by § 59.1501.3 (d) (1) or § 59.1-501.3 (d) (2). However, any
agreement to do so is subject to the following rules:
(1) An agreement that this chapter governs a transaction
does not alter the applicability of any rule or procedure that
may not be varied by agreement of the parties or that may
be varied only in a manner specified by the rule or
procedure, including the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
of 1977 (§ 59.1-196 et seq.). In addition, in a mass-market
transaction, the agreement does not alter the applicability of
a law applicable to a copy of information in printed form.
(2) An agreement that this chapter does not govern a
transaction:
(A) does not alter the applicability of § 59.1502.14 or § 59.1-508.16; and
(B) in a mass-market transaction, does not
alter the applicability under this chapter of the
doctrine of unconscionability or fundamental
public policy or the obligation of good faith.
(3) In a mass-market transaction, any term under this
section which changes the extent to which this chapter
governs the transaction must be conspicuous.
(4) A copy of a computer program contained in and sold or
leased as part of goods and which is excluded from this
chapter by § 59.1.501.3 (b) (1) cannot provide the basis for
an agreement under this section that this chapter governs
the transaction." [83]
c. Federal preemption:

"(a) A provision of this chapter which is preempted by
federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the
preemption." [84]
d. Conflicts with public policy:
"(b) If a term of a contract violates a fundamental public
policy, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce
the remainder of the contract without the impermissible
term, or limit the application of the impermissible term so
as to avoid a result contrary to public policy, in each case to
the extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly
outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of the
term." [85]
e. Virginia Consumer Protection Act:
"(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if this
chapter or a term of a contract under this chapter conflicts
with the Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977 (§ 59.1196 et seq.), the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
governs." [86]
f. Relationship with other laws:
"(d) If a law of this Commonwealth in effect on the
effective date of this chapter applies to a transaction
governed by this chapter, the following rules apply:
(1) A requirement that a term, waiver, notice,
or disclaimer be in a writing is satisfied by a
record.
(2) A requirement that a record, writing, or
term be signed is satisfied by an authentication.
(3) A requirement that a term be conspicuous,
or the like, is satisfied by a term that is
conspicuous under this chapter.
(4) A requirement of consent or agreement to
a term is satisfied by a manifestation of assent
to the term in accordance with this chapter."
[87]
2. Choice of Forum Provisions
"(a) The parties in their agreement may choose an exclusive judicial
forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust.
(b) A judicial forum specified in an agreement is not exclusive unless
the agreement expressly so provides." [88]

IV. THE USE OF COMPUTER CRIMES LAWS TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION
A. Advantages of Invoking Protections of Computer Crimes Laws
1. In the United States, at both the federal and state level, there are statutes enacted
specifically to prohibit "hacking" and other so-called "computer crimes." Some of
these statutes prohibit unauthorized access to and disclosure of communications that
have been stored electronically (such as voicemail and e-mail). [89]
2. Depending upon the circumstances, such statutes may provide a more effective
remedy than what is available for more traditional, "low tech" methods of trade
secret misappropriation. This is so for a number of reasons, including the following:
a. To prevail, the plaintiff whose computer system was infiltrated need
not prove the existence of trade secrets. This can be a significant
advantage because the fact that a "hacker" was successful makes it more
difficult for the franchisor to establish the reasonableness of its security
measures and that trade secret protection has not been lost.
b. Depending upon the location of the Internet Service Provider and the
web site or computer that was improperly accessed, it may be possible
to establish jurisdiction in a forum that is more convenient or
advantageous.
c. Such statutes may make it easier to seal all or part of the record so
that competitors, customers, and the news media do not learn of the
dispute.
B. Federal Computer Crimes Legislation
1. The major federal enactments in this area include the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, as amended by the National Information Infrastructure Protection Act
of 1996.
2. The offenses under the federal statute relate to anyone who "exceeds authorized
access" of a "protected computer."
a. The term "exceeds authorized access" means "to access a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information
in the computer that the accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter."
[90]
b. The term "protected computer" means a computer:
"(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the
United States Government, or, in the case of a computer not
used exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the
conduct constituting the offense affects that use by or for
the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or

communication." [91]
c. The term "computer" means:
"an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other
high speed processing device performing logical,
arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data
storage facility or communications facility directly related
to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such
term does not include an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar
device." [92]
d. The statutory definition of "computer" includes automated teller
machines. [93]
C. U.S. Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act
1. Federal law makes unauthorized access to stored communications a crime:
"(a) Offense. Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever-(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is
provided; or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that
facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in such system shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section." [94]
2. Federal law also makes unauthorized disclosure of stored communications a
crime:
"(a) Prohibitions. Except as provided in subsection (b)-(1) a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public shall not knowingly
divulge to any person or entity the contents of a
communication while in electronic storage by that service;
and
(2) a person or entity providing remote computing service
to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or
entity the contents of any communication which is carried
or maintained on that service-(A) on behalf of, and received by means of
electronic transmission from (or created by
means of computer processing of

communications received by means of
electronic transmission from), a subscriber or
customer of such service; and
(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage
or computer processing services to such
subscriber or customer, if the provider is not
authorized to access the contents of any such
communications for purposes of providing any
services other than storage or computer
processing." [95]
3. The statute also authorizes civil actions and remedies in the form of:
a. injunctive and declaratory relief;
b. actual damages plus the violator's profits in an amount not less than
$1,000; and
c. reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs. [96]
D. State Computer Crimes Laws
1. Every state except Vermont has enacted computer crimes laws. Typically, these
statutes provide both civil and criminal remedies against unauthorized use of a
computer. [97]
2. The Virginia Computer Crimes Act, Va. Code § 18.2-152.1 et seq., is typical of
enactments in this area.
a. The offenses of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act are keyed to "use"
of computers "without authority."
i. "Use" of computers is defined as follows:
"A person 'uses' a computer or computer
network when he:
1. Attempts to cause or causes a
computer or computer network to
perform or to stop performing
computer operations;
2. Attempts to cause or causes the
withholding or denial of the use of
a computer, computer network,
computer program, computer data
or computer software to another
user; or
3. Attempts to cause or causes
another person to put false

information into a computer." [98]
ii. "Without authority" is defined as follows:
"A person is 'without authority' when [...] he
has no right or permission of the owner to use
a computer or he uses a computer in a manner
exceeding such right or permission...." [99]
b. The Virginia Computer Crimes Act prohibits computer fraud, [100]
computer trespass, [101] computer invasion of privacy, [102] theft of
computer services, [103] and personal trespass by computer. [104]
c. Persons injured by violations of the Virginia Computer Crimes Act
can also recover damages, including lost profits, and the "costs of suit."
[105]
3. It may be possible to prevent competitors and other from learning of the dispute.
a. For example, the Virginia Computer Crimes Act expressly authorizes
sealing the record:
At the request of any party to an action brought pursuant to
this section, the court may, in its discretion, conduct all
legal proceedings in such a way as to protect the secrecy
and security of the computer, computer network, computer
data, computer program and computer software involved in
order to prevent possible recurrence of the same or a
similar act by another person and to protect any trade
secrets of any party. [106]
b. Similarly, every federal court "has supervisory power over its own
records and files." [107]
i. Access to court records may be denied "where court files
might . . . become a vehicle for improper purposes." [108]
ii. Such "improper purposes" include instances where court
records may be used "as sources of business information
that might harm a litigant's competitive standing." [109]
E. E-Mail As Computer Crimes
1. In CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., [110] the court held that, by sending
junk e-mail to CompuServe subscribers notwithstanding requests that they stop, the
defendants "have used [CompuServe's] equipment in a fashion that exceeds that
consent" and that "[t]he use of personal property exceeding consent is a trespass."
2. In United States v. Kammersell, [111] the defendant was indicted for "knowingly
transmit[ting] in interstate commerce to America Online, Ogden, Utah, a
communication to injure the person of another by means of a bomb . . . ."
Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the United States

did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the matter because the email was sent from
Utah to a person also in Utah and therefore was not an "interstate" communication.
Because the e-mail message first went to the server's facility in Virginia and then
went back to Utah, the court concluded that the defendant had used interstate
commerce to transmit his message.
F. Comparative Law
1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has served as a model for similar enactments
worldwide. [112]
G. Is Self-Help a "Computer Crime"?
V. REMEDIES UNDER UCITA
A. Available Remedies
1. Rescission [113]
2. Cancellation [114]
3. Modification by Contract [115]
4. Liquidated Damages [116]
5. Statute of Limitations
a. Four years after cause of action accrues or
b. One year after breach was or should have been discovered but
c. Not later than five years after cause of action accrues
d. Unless limited by contract to one year (except in consumer
contracts]. [117]
6. Remedies for Fraud [118]
7. Compensatory Damages
a. Measurement [119]
b. Licensor's damages [120]
c. Licensee's damages [121]
8. Recoupment [122]
9. Specific Performance [123]
B. Special Rules for Licenses/Self-Help
1. Licensor Remedies for Breach by Licensee

a. Complete work and identify to contract
b. Cease work
c. Relicense or dispose of
d. Other commercially reasonable steps
e. Pursue other remedies [124]
2. Licensee Remedies for Breach by Licensor
a. Continue to use information in accordance with contract terms
b. Pursue other remedies [125]
3. Self-Help
a. Discontinuing access
i. Material breach or
ii. If agreement so provides [126]
b. Right to possession and to prevent use [127]
4. Limitations on Electronic Self-Help
a. Licensee must manifest assent
b. Licensor must provide notice before disabling
c. Licensee may recover damages for wrongful electronic self-help
[128]
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